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Abstract
The Shapley value is defined as the average marginal contribution of a player,
taken over all possible ways to form the grand coalition N when one starts from
the empty coalition and adds players one by one. The authors have proposed in
a previous paper an allocation scheme for a general model of coalition formation
where the evolution of the coalition of active players is ruled by a Markov chain,
and need not finish at the grand coalition. The aim of this note is to develop some
explanations in the general context of time discrete stochastic processes, exhibit
new properties of the model, correct some inaccuracies in the original paper, and
give a new version of the axiomatization.
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1 Introduction
The Shapley value is a well-known allocation scheme for both TU- and NTU-games with
numerous applications. It is defined as the average marginal contribution of a player,
taken over all possible ways to form the grand coalition N when one starts from the
empty coalition and adds players one by one.
In real situations however, there is no a priori reason for a process of cooperation to
end with the grand coalition, nor are all ways of forming the grand coalition necessarily
feasible. This explains why the Shapley value can produce counterintuitive results in
some cases, as pointed out by, e.g., Roth (1980), Shafer (1980), and Scafuri and Yannelis
(1984).
Guided by these considerations, the authors have proposed an allocation scheme for
a general model of coalition formation (Faigle and Grabisch, 2012) where the evolution
of the coalition of active players is ruled by a Markov chain. The classical Shapley
value appears then as the particular case where the only transitions possible consist
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of the addition of a single player to the present coalition and all these transitions are
equiprobable.
The aim of this note is to develop some explanations in the even more general context
of time discrete stochastic processes that are not necessarily Markovian, exhibit new
properties of the model and correct some inaccuracies in the original paper (Faigle and
Grabisch, 2012). In particular, we give a new version of the axiomatization. We restrict
our exposition to the minimum, and refer the reader to the original paper for examples
and further details on the Markovian model.
2 Coalition processes and values
We consider a finite set of players N , with |N | = n. By a scenario S = S0, S1, S2, . . .
we mean a sequence of coalitions St ⊆ N starting with the empty set S0 = ∅. No
particular property is assumed on the sequence (there could be repetitions for example).
In this note, however, we will restrict ourselves to scenarios of finite length. We call any
2-element subsequence St, St+1 in S a transition in S and denote it by St → St+1.
A scenario S arises from the observation of the status of cooperation along (discrete)
time t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. We assume that a process of cooperation among players in N starts
formally from the empty coalition S0 = ∅ (no player is active), then coalition S1 is ob-
served, then S2, etc. Coalition St is the set of active players (those engaged in cooperation
or ready to cooperate) at time t. A finite scenario S = S0, S1, . . . , Sτ is said to be of length
τ with Sτ being the final state of cooperation. Note that we do not necessarily assume
Sτ = N .
Example 1. Letting N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, consider the scenario
S = ∅, 1, 14, 1, 123, 34
with the convention that 123 denotes {1, 2, 3} etc. At time t = 1, player 1 becomes active
and enters the current coalition. Then player 4 enters and is active at time t = 2 but
becomes inactive at time t = 3 and leaves the current coalition. Next, the players 2 and
3 enter at the same time, while in the last time step τ = 4, 1 and 2 leave and 4 enters.
So, players 3 and 4 finally cooperate while the other players abstain from the game.
The example illustrates how our model captures the original idea of Shapley and
generalizes it (see Faigle and Grabisch (2012) for real examples from exchange economies
of Hart and Kurz (1983) and Scafuri and Yannelis (1984)).
We assume that scenarios are produced by some stochastic process, ruling the possible
transitions between coalitions. In Faigle and Grabisch (2012), we have considered a
Markov chain defined by a 2n × 2n transition matrix U := [uS,T ]S,T⊆N , where uS,T is
the probability of the transition S → T to occur if S is the currently active coalition.
Therefore, the probability of a scenario S = ∅, S1, . . . , Sτ to occur is simply
Pr(S) =
τ∏
k=1
uSi−1,Si ,
with S0 = ∅. In general, we have probability distributions p
t on 2N with pt(S) being the
probability that S is the active coalition at time t. pt can be viewed as the state of the
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coalition formation process at time t. Convergence to a limit state can be obtained by
standard results in Markov chain theory.
We define an allocation scheme (value) for a general cooperation formation framework
as follows. First, for any given scenario S = ∅, S1, . . . , Sτ , we define what we call a
scenario-value, that is, an allocation scheme for the considered scenario: ψS : G(N)→ Rn,
where G(N) is the set of TU-games on N . Then, the value ψ is the family (ψ(τ) of the
expectations of the scenario-values at time τ :
ψ(τ)(v) =
∑
S∈Sτ
Pr(S)ψS(v),
where Sτ denotes the collection of all scenarios of length τ . Therefore, it suffices to
concentrate on the definition of a suitable scenario-value. In (Faigle and Grabisch, 2012),
we have introduced the so-called Shapley II value as follows.
Consider a scenario S = ∅, S1, . . . , Sτ , and a particular transition St → St+1 in S. The
players in the symmetric difference St∆St+1 = (St \ St+1) ∪ (St+1 \ St) are active at time
t in St → St+1 as they either leave or enter the current coalition St. The Shapley II value
for player i is the sum of marginal contributions of i in each transition where i is active.
We clarify this notion in more detail.
Suppose thus that i ∈ St∆St+1 is active. If i is the only active player at time t, the
marginal contribution is simply v(St+1)−v(St) because i’s activity causes this change in v.
If |St∆St+1| ≥ 2, the Shapley II value decomposes St → St+1 into elementary transitions
(i.e., transitions such that only one player enters or leaves) and considers all possibilities
of doing so. For example, the transition 2 → 13, where player 2 leaves and players 1,3
enter, can be decomposed into 3! = 6 different ways (so-called paths) corresponding to
all permutations of players 1,2,3:
2→ ∅ → 1→ 13
2→ ∅ → 3→ 13
2→ 12→ 1→ 13
2→ 12→ 123→ 13
2→ 23→ 3→ 13
2→ 23→ 123→ 13
In each path, the marginal contribution is computed as the difference v(T ′)−v(T ), where
i is active in the elementary transition T → T ′. For example, the marginal contribution
of player 1 is v(1)− v(∅) in the 1st path, v(13)− v(3) in the second, while the marginal
contribution of player 2 is v(∅) − v(2) for these two paths. Averaging on all paths, we
obtain the following marginal contributions for transition 1→ 23:
φ1→231 (v) =
1
6
v(1) +
1
3
(v(13)− v(3)) +
1
3
(v(12)− v(2)) +
1
6
(v(123)− v(23))
φ1→232 (v) = −
1
3
v(2) +
1
6
(v(1)− v(12)) +
1
3
(v(13)− v(123)) +
1
6
(v(3)− v(23))
φ1→233 (v) =
1
6
v(3) +
1
3
(v(13)− v(1)) +
1
6
(v(123)− v(12)) +
1
3
(v(23)− v(2)).
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In summary, the Shapley II scenario-value is computed as follows:
φSi (v) =
∑
t|i∈St∆St+1
φ
St→St+1
i (v) (1)
with
φ
St→St+1
i (v) =
1
|St∆St+1|!
∑
P from St to St+1
(v(S ′
P
)− v(SP)) (2)
where ”P from S to T” is any path from S to T in 2N , and (SP, S
′
P
) is the unique edge
(transition) of P such that either {i} = SP \ S
′
P
or {i} = S ′
P
\ SP.
Notice that the computation of the marginal contribution in a transition S → T
resembles the computation of the classical Shapley value relative to the set S∆T of
active players. We formalize this idea. Consider a transition S → T . It is convenient to
introduce the mapping
ΓS,T : S∆T → ŜT , K 7→ K∆S,
where ŜT is the collection of sets in S ∪ T containing S ∩ T (observe that K∆S always
contains S ∩T ). The inverse mapping Γ−1 : ŜT → S∆T is simply K 7→ K∆S again, and
we have a bijection between S∆T and ŜT .
Next we introduce the local game vS,T on the set of active players S∆T , defined by
vS,T (K) = v(Γ(K))− v(S) = v(K∆S)− v(S), K ⊆ S∆T.
Also v(K) = vS,T (K∆S) + v(S) on ŜT .
Observe that if i is entering, then we have {i} = S ′
P
\SP in the above notation. So the
marginal contribution in φS→Ti is v(SP∪i)−v(SP). Since i 6∈ S, the marginal contribution
is vS,T ((SP∆S) ∪ i) − vS,T (SP∆S). If i is leaving, the marginal contribution in φ
S→T
i is
v(SP \ i) − v(SP). Since i ∈ S, however, the marginal contribution in terms of the local
game is still vS,T ((SP∆S)∪ i)−vS,T (SP∆S), which is a term of the classical Shapley value
of i in vS,T , denoted by φ
Sh
i (vS,T ). Since Γ is a bijection, the computation of φ
S→T
i (v)
amounts to the computation of φShi (vS,T ). We have shown:
φS→T (v) = φSh(vS,T ). (3)
where φSh is the classical Shapley value.
3 Axiomatization of the Shapley II value
We denote by ψ : G → Rn×S a scenario-value, where S is the set of finite sequences of
coalitions (not necessarily starting with ∅).
Two sequences S = S1, . . . , Sq, S
′ = S ′1, . . . , S
′
r are said to be concatenable if Sq = S
′
1,
in which case their concatenation is the sequence
S⊕ S′ := S1, . . . , Sq, S
′
2, . . . , S
′
r.
Concatenation (C): Let S, S′ be two concatenable sequences. Then
ψS⊕S
′
= ψS + ψS
′
.
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Axiom (C) allows us to restrict our attention to transitions. Indeed,
ψS =
t−1∑
k=0
ψSk→Sk+1
holds for every sequence S = S0, S1, . . . , St.
Inactive players in transitions (IP): If i is inactive in S → T , then
ψS→Ti (v) = 0 for any game v.
Efficiency for transitions (E): For any transition S → T and game v, we
have ∑
i∈N
ψS→Ti (v) = v(T )− v(S).
Linearity for transitions (L): v 7→ ψS→T (v) is a linear operator for any
transition S → T .
Symmetry for transitions (S): For any i ∈ N , any transition S → T and
any permutation σ on N , one has
ψS→Ti (v) = ψ
σ(S)→σ(T )
σ(i) (v ◦ σ
−1).
We introduce the signature of a transition S → T as the parameter
τ(S → T ) := (|S \ T |, |T \ S|, |S ∩ T |).
As shown in Faigle and Grabisch (2012), the signature is invariant under permutations,
and moreover, two scenarios are equal up to a permutation of the players if and only if
they thave the same signature.
i ∈ N is a null player for v if v(S ∪ i) = v(S) for all S ⊆ N \ i.
Null axiom for transitions (N): Every null player i obtains ψS→Ti (v) = 0
relative to every transition S → T .
Two players i, j are antisymmetric if v(K ∪ {i, j}) = v(K) for every K ⊆ N \ {i, j}.
Antisymmetry for entering/leaving players (ASEL): if i ∈ S \ T and
j ∈ T \ S are antisymmetric for v, then ψS→Ti (v) = ψ
S→T
j (v).
Antisymmetric players have in some sense a counterbalancing effect: they annihilate each
other when entering together a coalition, which can be interpreted by saying that they
bring the same contribution but of opposite sign. Therefore, if one is leaving and the
other entering, their contribution in the scenario becomes equal and of same sign.
Theorem 1. A scenario-value satisfies (C), (L), (IP), (E), (S), (N) and (ASEL) if and
only if it is the Shapley II scenario-value.
5
(see proof in Appendix)
An important point to note is that, in contrast to the classical case, two symmetry
axioms are present. Relative to the transition S → T , the first one, axiom (S), says that
set of players can be freely permuted provided they all belong to one of the groups S \T ,
T \ S, S ∩ T , or N \ (S ∪ T ). Now (IP) implies that we do not have to bother about
players in S ∩ T and N \ (S ∪ T ). The second symmetry axiom (ASEL) tells us how
to exchange players between S \ T and T \ S. Interestingly, however, both axioms can
be deduced from the application of the classical symmetry axiom to the local game vS,T .
Indeed, consider two symmetric players i, j ∈ S∆T for vS,T , i.e., vS,T (K∪i) = vS,T (K∪j)
holds for any K ⊆ (S∆T ) \ {i, j}. In the case i, j ∈ S \ T , this yields
v((K∆S) \ i) = v((K∆S) \ j),
or, setting K ′ = (K∆S) \ {i, j}, v(K ′ ∪ i) = v(K ′ ∪ j), which means symmetry of i, j for
v for sets in ŜT \ {i, j}. If i, j ∈ T \ S, we have
v((K∆S) ∪ i) = v((K∆S) ∪ j)
which also exhibits symmetry of i, j for those sets. In rhe case i ∈ S \ T and j ∈ T \ S,
we obtain
v((K∆S) \ i) = v((K∆S) ∪ j),
or, setting K ′ = (K∆S) \ i, v(K ′) = v(K ′ ∪ {i, j}), for every K ′ ⊆ ŜT \ {i, j}. But this
is precisely antisymmetry.
In the original paper, antisymmetric players were defined as players i, j satisfying
v(K ∪ i)− v(K) = v(K ∪ {i, j})− v(K ∪ i)
v(K ∪ j)− v(K) = v(K ∪ {i, j})− v(K ∪ j)
for any K ⊆ N \ i, j. Then two such antisymmetric players i, j satisfy ψS→Ti (v) =
−ψS→Tj (v) for any sequence S → T with i ∈ S \ T and j ∈ T \ S. It can be checked
that Shapley II does have this antisymmetric property. However, it is too weak to ensure
uniqueness of the scenario value.
Another interesting property is the following one, which was not mentionned in Faigle
and Grabisch (2012).
Changing Role (CR): for any S, T ⊆ N , for any i ∈ N \ (S ∪ T ), and any
game v, we have ψS∪i→Ti (v) = −ψ
S→T∪i
i (v).
Consider a transition S → T where player i is not participating (i.e., i 6∈ S ∪ T ).
Suppose now that player i joins T , that is, i becomes an entering player in the transition
S → T ∪ i. Then i is active in this transition and has some marginal contribution, say
α. In contrast, assume now that player i joins S and leaves during the transition, i.e.,
we consider the transition S ∪ i → T . Then i is active in this transition and has some
marginal contribution, say β. Note that (S ∪ i)∆T = S∆(T ∪ i), which means that the
set of active players is the same, only the roˆle of i has been switched from entering to
leaving, and the rest is left unchanged. Under these conditions, axiom (CR) says that
the marginal contributions of i in these two transitions are opposite, i.e., β = −α.
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We claim that Shapley II satisfies (CR). To establish the claim, we consider a transi-
tion S → T with S ∪ T 6= N , and i ∈ N \ (S ∪ T ). We know that for any v
φS→T∪ii (v) = φ
Sh
i (vS,T∪i), φ
S∪i→T
i (v) = φ
Sh
i (vS∪i,T ).
Setting ℓ = |(S ∪ i)∆T | = |S∆(T ∪ i), |K| = k, we find:
φShi (vS∪i,T ) =
∑
K⊆((S∪i)∆T )\i
(ℓ− k − 1)!k!
ℓ!
(vS∪i,T (K ∪ i)− vS∪i,T (K))
=
∑
K⊆S∆T
(ℓ− k − 1)!k!
ℓ!
(v(K∆S)− v((K∆S) ∪ i))
φShi (vS,T∪i) =
∑
K⊆(S∆(T∪i))\i
(ℓ− k − 1)!k!
ℓ!
(vS,T∪i(K ∪ i)− vS,T∪i(K))
=
∑
K⊆S∆T
(ℓ− k − 1)!k!
ℓ!
(v((K∆S) ∪ i)− v(K∆S)),
which proves the claim. However, it can be demonstrated that the axiomatization of
Shapley II fails if (CR) replaces (ASEL).
Acknowledgments
We wish to thank Jean-Franc¸ois Caulier and Agnieszka Rusinowska for fruitful discussions
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4 Proof of Theorem 1
(⇐) We check that (ASEL) is satisfied by Shapley II, the rest is left to the reader. It
suffices to establish the antisymmetry property for a transition S → T . Let us argue that
i, j being antisymmetric for v implies that i, j are symmetric in the classical sense for
vS,T , i.e., vS,T (K ∪ i) = vS,T (K ∪ j) holds for all K in S∆T \ {i, j}. Indeed, this would
yield φS→Ti (v) = φ
Sh
i (vS,T ) = φ
Sh
j (vS,T ) = φ
S→T
j (v), the desired result.
Now, v(K ∪ {i, j}) = v(K) for any K ⊆ ŜT \ {i, j} is equivalent to
vS,T ((K∆S) ∪ {i, j}) = vS,T (K∆S)
or
vS,T (K
′ ∪ j) = vS,T (K
′ ∪ i)
with K ′ = (K∆S) \ i, which proves the claim.
(⇒) Since (C) is satisfied, it suffices to derive an expression for transitions. Under
(L), (S), (N), it is shown in (Faigle and Grabisch, 2012, Prop. 2) that the value takes the
form:
ψS→Ti =


∑
K⊆N\i aτ(S→T ),τ(S→T |K∪i)(v(K ∪ i)− v(K)), if i ∈ S \ T∑
K⊆N\i bτ(S→T ),τ(S→T |K∪i)(v(K ∪ i)− v(K)), if i ∈ T \ S
0, otherwise,
where τ(S → T |K) := (|(S \ T ) ∩ K|, |(T \ S) ∩ K|, |S ∩ T ∩ K|, |K \ (S ∪ T )|), and
aτ(S→T ),τ(S→T |K∪i) and bτ(S→T ),τ(S→T |K∪i) are real coefficients. Then axioms (IP) and (E)
imply: ∑
i∈N
ψS→Ti (v) = v(T )− v(S)
=
∑
i∈S\T
∑
K⊆N\i
aτ(S→T ),τ(S→T |K∪i)(v(K ∪ i)− v(K))
+
∑
i∈T\S
∑
K⊆N\i
bτ(S→T ),τ(S→T |K∪i)(v(K ∪ i)− v(K))
=
∑
K⊆N
v(K)
(
klaτ,kl,kr,kc,k0 + krbτ,kl,kr,kc,k0
− (l − kl)aτ,kl+1,kr,kc,k0 − (r − kr)bτ,kl,kr+1,kc,k0
)
,
with the following notations: τ(S → T ) =: τ , |S \ T | =: l, |T \ S| =: r, |S ∩ T | =: c,
|K| = k, τ(S → T |K) = (kl, kr, kc, k0), with kl = |(S \ T ) ∩ K|, kr = |(T \ S) ∩ K|,
kc = |S ∩T ∩K|, and k0 = k−kl−kr−kc = |K \ (S ∪T )|. Let us drop also the subindex
τ since it is present everywhere. This gives by identification:
lal,0,c,0 − rbl,1,c,0 = −1 (4)
−la1,r,c,0 + rb0,r,c,0 = 1 (5)
klakl,kr,kc,k0 + krbkl,kr,kc,k0 − (l − kl)akl+1,kr,kc,k0
−(r − kr)bkl,kr+1,kc,k0 = 0, ∀K 6= S, T. (6)
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Note that 1 ≤ kl ≤ l for akl,kr,kc,k0 , 1 ≤ kr ≤ r for bkl.kr.kc.k0 , and in (3) the configurations
(ll, kr, kc, k0) = (l, 0, c, 0) and (0, r, c, 0) are excluded.
1. Suppose that S ⊂ T holds, i.e., τ = (0, t− s, s). Then l = kl = 0, r = t− s, c = s,
and (4), (5) yield b0,1,s,0 =
1
t−s
and b0,r,s,0 =
1
t−s
, and the remaining equations become:
krb0,kr,kc,k0 − (r − kr)b0,kr+1,kc,k0 = 0, ∀K 6= S, T.
If K ∩ T \ S = ∅, this reduces to
b0,1,kc,k0 = 0, ∀kc, k0 (7)
except the case (kc = s, k0 = 0), which corresponding to S. Similarly, K ⊇ T \ S yields
b0,t−s,kc,k0 = 0, ∀kc, k0, (8)
except in the case (kc = s, k0 = 0), which corresponds to T .
So it remains to examine the case where all K satisfy K ∩ (T \S) 6= ∅ and K 6⊇ T \S
(i.e., 0 < kr < t−s). We prove by induction that b0,kr+1,kc,k0 = 0 holds for all 0 < kr < t−s
and kc, k0, except for kc = s, k0 = 0, i.e., for K = S ∪ L with ∅ 6= L ⊂ T \ S, where
b0,kr+1,s,0 =
kr!
(t− s) · · · (t− s− kr)
.
For kr = 1, we have
b0,1,kc,k0 − (r − 1)b0,2,kc,k0 = 0.
From (7) we get b0,1,kc,k0 = 0 except if (kc = s, k0 = 0), which entails b0,2,kc,k0 = 0 for
all kc, k0 except b0,2,s,0 =
1
(t−s)(t−s−1)
, the expected result. Assume that the assumption is
true up to kr and compute the case kr + 1, assuming kr + 1 < t− s. We find
(kr + 1)b0,kr+1,kc,k0 − (r − kr − 1)b0,kr+2,kc,k0 = 0
By the assumption, the first term vanishes for all kc, k0, except for kc = s and k0 = 0.
This implies the second term to vanish except when
b0,kr+2,s,0 =
(kr + 1)!
(t− s) · · · (t− s− kr)(t− s− kr − 1)
.
Therefore, the expression of ψS→Ti becomes
ψS→Ti (v) =
∑
K⊇S
K⊆T\i
(t− s− kr − 1)!kr!
(t− s)!
(v(K ∪ i)− v(K)),
which is the expression of the Shapley value for a game on the set T \ S.
2. The case T ⊂ S is analyzed similarly.
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3. It remains to settle the case where S \T 6= ∅ and T \S 6= ∅ hold. Take any i ∈ S \T
and j ∈ T \ S and suppose that there are antisymmetric for v, i.e., v(K ∪ {i, j}) = v(K)
for any K ⊆ N \ {i, j}. This yields
ψS→Ti (v) =
∑
K⊆N\i
akl+1,kr,kc,k0(v(K ∪ i)− v(K))
=
∑
K⊆N\i
K∋j
akl+1,kr,kc,k0(v(K \ j)− v(K)) +
∑
K⊆N\i
K 6∋j
akl+1,kr,kc,k0(v(K ∪ i)− v(K))
=
∑
K⊆N\{i,j}
(
v(K)(akl+1,kr+1,kc,k0 − akl+1,kr,kc,k0) + v(K ∪ i)akl+1,kr,kc,k0
+ v(K ∪ j)(−akl+1,kr+1,kc,ko)
)
.
Similarly,
ψS→Tj (v) =
∑
K⊆N\j
K∋i
bkl,kr+1,kc,k0(v(K \ i)− v(K)) +
∑
K⊆N\j
K 6∋i
bkl,kr+1,kc,k0(v(K ∪ j)− v(K))
=
∑
K⊆N\{i,j}
(
v(K)(bkl+1,kr+1,kc,k0 − bkl,kr+1,kc,k0) + v(K ∪ i)(−bkl+1,kr+1,kc,k0)+
v(K ∪ j)bkl,kr+1,kc,ko
)
.
Since ψS→Ti (v) = ψ
S→T
j (v) for any such game we deduce the system
akl+1,kr+1,kc,k0 − akl+1,kr,kc,k0 = bkl+1,kr+1,kc,k0 − bkl,kr+1,kc,k0
akl+1,kr,kc,k0 = −bkl+1,kr+1,kc,k0
akl+1,kr+1,kc,k0 = −bkl,kr+1,kc,k0 ,
for 0 ≤ kl ≤ l − 1, 0 ≤ kr ≤ r − 1, 0 ≤ kc ≤ c, and 0 ≤ k0 ≤ n− |S ∪ T |, with the above
conventions. Remark that the first line is redundant. Substituting in (4), (5) we obtain
al,0,c,0 = −
1
l + r
, a1,r,c,0 = −
1
l + r
. (9)
Substitution into (6) leads to
(kl + r − kr)akl,kr,kc,k0 − (kr + l − kl)akl+1,kr,kc,k0 = 0 (10)
with the restriction 1 ≤ kl ≤ l − 1, 1 ≤ kr ≤ r − 1. For the remaining cases, we get:
−(l + kr)a1,kr,kc,k0 + (r − kr)a1,kr+1,kc,k0 = 0, kl = 0, 0 ≤ kr ≤ r (11)
(kl + r)akl,0,kc,k0 − (l − kl)akl+1,0,kc,k0 = 0, 1 ≤ kl ≤ l − 1, kr = 0 (12)
klakl,r,kc,k0 − (l − kl + r)akl+1,r,kc,k0 = 0, 1 ≤ kl ≤ l − 1, kr = r (13)
(l + r − kr)al,kr,kc,k0 − kral,kr−1,kc,k0 = 0, kl = l, 0 ≤ kr ≤ r, (14)
where in (11) the case (kr = r, kc = c, k0 = 0) is excluded, and in (14) the case (kr =
0, kc = c, k0 = 0) is excluded.
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We claim that all coefficients corresponding to K \ (S ∪ T ) 6= ∅ (i.e., k0 > 0) or
K 6⊇ (S ∩ T ) (i.e., kc < c) vanish. Suppose then that k0 > 0 and kc < c is given. From
(14) with kr = 0, we deduce al,0,kc,k0 = 0. Substitution in (12) with kl = l − 1 yields
al−1,0,kc,k0 = 0. Successive application of (12), again with kl = l − 2, . . . , 1, yields
akl,0,kc,k0 = 0, 1 ≤ kl ≤ l.
Since al,0,kc,k0 is also present in (14) with kr = 1, we have al,1,kc,k0 = 0. Now, in (10),
al,1,kc,k0 is present with (kl = l − 1, kr = 1), which yields al−1,1,kc,k0 = 0. Applying again
(10) with kl = l − 2, . . . , 1 we deduce
akl,1,kc,k0 = 0, 1 ≤ kl ≤ l.
al,1,kc,k0 is present also in (14) with kr = 2. Proceeding as above we get
akl,2,kc,k0 = 0, 1 ≤ kl ≤ l.
This can be done until kr = r in (14), which gives al,r,kc,k0 = 0. Then (13) has to be used
with kl = l − 1 and so on. This yields
akl,r,kc,k0 = 0, 1 ≤ kl ≤ l.
In summary, akl,kr,kc,k0 = 0 holds for 1 ≤ kl ≤ l, 0 ≤ kr ≤ r, 0 ≤ kc < c and 0 < k0 ≤
n− |S ∪ T |, and our claim is proved.
Substituting into (10) to (14), we find
(kl + r − kr)akl,kr,c,0 − (kr + l − kl)akl+1,kr,c,0 = 0, 1 ≤ kl ≤ l − 1, 1 ≤ kr ≤ r − 1 (15)
−(l + kr)a1,kr,c,0 + (r − kr)a1,kr+1,c,0 = 0, 0 ≤ kr ≤ r − 1 (16)
(kl + r)akl,0,c,0 − (l − kl)akl+1,0,c,0 = 0, 1 ≤ kl ≤ l − 1 (17)
klakl,r,c,0 − (l − kl + r)akl+1,r,c,0 = 0, 1 ≤ kl ≤ l − 1 (18)
(l + r − kr)al,kr,c,0 − kral,kr−1,c,0 = 0, 1 ≤ kr ≤ r. (19)
Observe that the system (16) together with a1,r,c,0 = −
1
l+r
is a triangular system of r+1
equations in r+1 variables a1,0,c,0, . . . , a1,r,c,0. It has therefore a unique solution. The same
observation applies to the systems (17) with al,0,c,0 = −
1
l+r
, (18) with a1,r,c,0 = −
1
l+r
, and
(19) with al,0,c,0 = −
1
l+r
, which determines in a unique way the variables a1,0,c,0, . . . , al,0,c,0,
a1,r,c,0, . . . , al,r,c,0, and al,0,c,0, . . . , al,r,c,0 respectively.
Substituting into the system (15), we find a system of (l− 1)(r − 1) equations in the
(l−1)(r−1) variables a2,1,c,0, . . . , a2,r−1,c,0, a3,1,c,0, . . . , a3,r−1,c,0, . . ., al−1,1,c,0, . . . , al−1,r−1,c,0,
which is triangular and consequently has a unique solution. Since we know that the
coefficients of the Shapley II scenario value satisfy (15) to (19), it is the unique solution.
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